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This paper explores the extent to which political scientists and 
international relations scholars possess the empirical evidence 
required to determine the applicability of bargaining models to the 
development of EC environmental policy. Particular attention will be 
paid to Council bargaining which occurred under conditions of 
unanimity prior to the Single European Act (1972-1986).
The paper has two aims. First, to clarify the phenomenon which 
bargaining models need to explain—how integration has "ratcheted 
up" environmental standards instead of yielding a series of lowest 
common denominator outcomes which merely reflect pre-existing 
national environmental policies. The second objective is to determine 
which bargaining dynamics facilitated consensus on such stringent 
standards. In other words, the paper seeks to answer the question why, 
when it came to Council bargaining, did the respective national 
governments agree to sign these laws?
Empirical evidence suggests that dynamics varied across time and 
between states. In some cases bargaining outcomes reflected slack 
cutting, side-payments or issue linkage inherent to 
intergovemmentalism and two-level games. However, many of the 
paper's findings challenge the characterisation of EC environmental 
integration as a strict product of intergovernmental bargaining. 
National governments frequently agreed to EC Directives which later 
produced entirely unanticipated and undesired costs beyond the scope 



























































































In addressing the question "why did they sign?", this paper explores the 
content and development of EC environmental policy. In so doing, it highlights 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of functionalism and liberal 
intergovernmental bargaining as competing theories of European integration. 
Analysis focuses on secondary community law, and on decisionmaking under 
conditions of unanimity 1972-86. This excludes consideration of international 
environmental agreements, although a more thorough analysis would 
undoubtedly need to consider the extent to which negotiations in international 
arenas, in addition to yielding effective environmental protection (Haas, 
Keohane and Levy 1993), shape the development of secondary EC law.
I. Ratcheting
The term "ratcheting" has been used to describe the adoption of EC 
environmental standards which are more stringent than pre-existing national 
laws in the member states. EC laws can ratchet up standards for one state, a few, 
or the entire group. Although claims of ratcheting under conditions of 
unanimous voting prior to the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) are 
widespread in the literature (Sbragia 1993, 1996, Vogel 1996, Haigh 1984, 
Rehbinder and Stewart 1985), tracing these to the source often gives a muddy 
picture of the integration process. Significant ratcheting depends on whether EC 
law was harmonised at a high or a low standard, and whether substantial costs 
were incurred at the national level. Unfortunately neither of these questions is 
addressed in any rigorous sense by available studies, although several 
dissertations have been devoted to establishing the relationship between 
national standards and EC laws (see Golub 1994, and the Phd research of Inger 
Weibust at MIT).
Much of the basis for claims of ratcheting is a single series of reports by 
EC lawyers, in which there is no consistent analysis of national conditions 
before harmonisation, no effort to distinguish cosmetic legal changes from 
substantive policy changes, and very little attempt made to assess the costs 
imposed on various national actors by EC directives (Haigh et al 1986). In 
terms of the central questions noted above, the case studies suffer from 
incongruities between the usually quoted series conclusion (vol. 1), the actual 
examples in the country reports (vols. 2-4), and the conclusions offered by the 




























































































national law was already in the pipeline, and may not have imposed any 
additional costs on domestic polluters. The absence of these two conditions 
suggests the absence of significant ratcheting.
It should be pointed out that contributions to Pinter's EC Membership 
Evaluated Series, a second group of articles often cited to support ratcheting, 
suffer from the same, if not more severe, methodological limitations. Most of 
the articles are written from a purely legal perspective, thus ignoring both of the 
conditions needed for actual ratcheting, and for many states analysis is 
extremely limited, making no effort to determine pre-existing national 
conditions, bargaining dynamics or costs of adopted EC legislation.
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that EC laws imposed an enormous 
ratcheting effect on Southern Europe: the entry of these states required 
wholesale adoption of EC directives against a sometimes tabula rasa 
background (Collier and Golub 1996, La Spina and Sciortino 1993), and while 
recent events took place under QMV, Greece participated in five years of EC 
environmental policymaking under conditions of unanimous voting, during 
which time many standards were adopted which far exceeded its pre-existing 
national measures. For the original member states, on the other hand, the picture 
is fuzzy, the example of nitrates in drinking water often being put forward as 
indicative of widespread ratcheting. This example, as well as other cases of 
ratcheting, are discussed below in the context of bargaining mechanisms.
II. Why did they sign?
Functionalism
One explanation which has been offered to explain why member states 
adopted EC environmental laws emphasises the role of functionalism. A 
number of authors have identified geographic spillover (international 
recognition of transboundary pollution) and economic spillover as reasons why 
the Community became involved in environmental policy, and why it produced 
its first Environmental Action Programme in 1973 (Pollack 1994, Hildebrand 
1993, Haigh 1984, Brenton 1994). As important as these issues are in 
explaining EC task expansion, economic spillover and the rise of global 
environmental movements tell us nothing about what these coordinated actions 
look like, the actual content of EC laws. For example, completion of the market 
could have been accomplished equally well by either lowest or highest common 




























































































explaining the integration process because it ignores variation amongst 
countries for why they signed actual policies, as well as overlooking the 
distribution of gains and losses when dealing with coordinated action and 
negative externalities.
In addition to economic spillover, however, functionalist theory also 
contends that psychological spillover—aspects of which have been referred to as 
engrenage, or copinage technocratique— represents an important mechanism 
which explains unexpectedly high regulatory outcomes. At the core of the 
argument is the claim that national technical experts and national political 
representatives, particularly those meeting repeatedly in COREPER and a 
bewildering array of working groups, develop a level of collective identity 
which fosters cooperation and mutual concessions. Under this type of 
policymaking, often called "problem solving", national interests are redefined 
or no longer defended, and distributional questions vanish as rational 
calculations give way to common goals (Héritier et al 1996, Majone 1993, 
Peterson 1995, Haas 1958, Haas 1964, Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 1996, de 
Zwaan 1995).
For its empirical support, much of this theoretical literature draws upon a 
single but substantial study of harmonisation in the field of health and safety at 
work (Eichener 1992). Eichener's study deals with a group of directives which 
were based on Article 100A and were thus subject to QMV. However, the 
functionalist dynamics described by Eichener could also apply under 
unanimous voting. The functionalist literature assumes this possibility—its 
frequent rehearsals of Eichener's findings as definitive evidence for 
functionalist logic are never accompanied by language limiting the claim to pre- 
1987 Community development. One of the central goals of the analysis set out 
below is therefore to determine whether the available evidence suggests that EU 
environmental policymaking prior to the SEA exhibits the functionalist 
dynamics identified by Eichener.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism ?
Constituting an important advance over realism, liberal
intergovernmentalism (LI) suggests a model whereby European integration 
proceeds by a sequential process of domestic preference formation followed by 
intergovernmental bargaining (Moravcsik 1993, 1994). Despite his admirable 
and painstaking attention to a vast array of empirical evidence, Moravcsik has 
consistently refused to extend this powerful theory to cover daily policymaking, 




























































































of the original treaty, the SEA, Maastricht, and the establishment of the ERM. 
While claiming to model "European integration," this dramatic restriction of the 
dependent variable excludes from analysis the hundreds of EC laws which in 
fact may constitute the bulk of European integration (Golub 1996a). As 
currently constructed, liberal intergovemmentalism offers few insights into the 
preferences and influence of actors involved in daily policymaking, and thus no 
predictions about the content of EC law.
Nevertheless, LI represents the most highly developed model of European 
integration to date, and there is no reason why it cannot be extended to "daily 
policymaking" in a way which Moravcsik resists. In the following pages I make 
a preliminary effort to do so, asking first, how much of the question "why did 
they sign?" can be answered by a bargaining model, and second, which factors 
beyond bargaining should we consider? The strengths and limitations of the 
bargaining explanation cast light on important aspects of the integration 
process, particularly the relative persuasiveness of LI and functionalism.
I should note at the outset that this paper will not address the issue of 
agenda-setting. While its failure to capture the complexities of agenda-setting 
may constitute a fatal flaw in LI, for the purposes of this paper the issue would 
only become decisive if one could show that member states effectively had no 
choice but to sign the specific proposals on the table. I have argued elsewhere 
that in most cases agenda-setting involves separate elements of influence and 
power, whereby the Commission acts as a reservoir of innovative ideas from 
which the Council selects at its leisure, thereby retaining individual power of 
the member states under unanimity or collective power under QMV (Golub 
1996a). Furthermore, a powerful agenda-setting role for the Commission, 
Parliament, media, scientists or any other number of actors does not by itself 
deny the importance of the bargaining mechanisms outlined below. Policy 
entrepreneurs and agenda-setters must still convince all the states to sign.
To extend LI to daily policymaking, and to the production of 
environmental policy in particular, it is necessary to consider both the process 
of domestic preference formation and the potential bargaining dynamics.
Preference formation: For our purposes the key domestic players which 
influence national preference formation are industrial/producer groups, and 
green groups. Because of the distribution of costs and benefits from regulation, 
in general the former is concentrated, dominates control and provision of 
technical information, and traditionally enjoys insider status with government 
officials, while the latter is more dispersed and traditionally exerts weaker 




























































































we would expect that the interests of these groups would be first to gain 
competitive advantages against their European counterparts, and second to 
avoid adjustment costs and the resulting competitive disadvantages stemming 
from EC environmental regulation. Under an extended version of LI, these 
preferences would be taken on by national representatives and defended 
throughout the negotiating process in Brussels.
Bargaining dynamics: Although the dominant position of producer 
groups gives rise to the common national preference of avoiding economic 
disadvantages, traditions of environmental protection vary amongst EC states, 
generating different environmental "baselines" in each country. With varying 
baselines, we can make predictions about which countries might gain from EC 
harmonisation, and thus the incentives underpinning why these states might 
have signed EC environmental directives. While no state is an environmental 
leader in every sector, a crude ranking by national environmental concern might 
produce the following: Netherlands/Germany/Denmark manifest high levels of 
environmental protection, while France/UK/Belgium and Italy manifest lower 
levels. The hypothesis is that EC standards will not exceed the regulatory levels 
dictated by dominant domestic actors in laggard states at any given point in 
time unless specific bargaining mechanisms are employed.
Following the analysis of Rehbinder and Stewart (1985:9-13), 
environmental states understandably seek harmonisation at the highest possible 
levels, but could reasonably be expected to sign just about any EC 
environmental law, whether product standards or process standards, as each of 
these has the potential to raise costs in the more polluting states and prevent 
social dumping. Polluting states would certainly oppose process standards, and 
also harmonised product standards if foreign environmental trade barriers could 
be overcome by legal challenge under Article 30 (negative commerce clause). 
Alternatively, if legal recourse were precluded, polluter states would support 
product standards at the lowest possible level. Under conditions of unanimity, 
the resulting incentive structure would predict harmonised but lax product 
standards, and no harmonisation of process standards beyond the LCD 
(Rehbinder and Stewart 1985:11). Thus we expect many LCD outcomes from a 
tying-hands strategy (Putnam 1988), with national industry and producer groups 
constituting the essential domestic constituencies which constrain government 
bargaining. With its negotiating line dictated by these groups, no state 
government would willingly accept higher production costs or barred exports at 




























































































III. EC Environmental Law: LCD Bargaining Outcomes
In fact, a wide range of evidence might lead one to characterise EC 
environmental policy prior to the SEA as a series of LCD bargaining outcomes 
based on domestic industrial preferences, with ratcheting constituting the rare 
exception to the rule. First of all there are examples where a national veto 
precluded any bargaining outcome, as with the UK and paper pulp or sea 
dumping proposals (Golub 1994). Although the British government was 
responding to pressure from national industry, it also invoked the subsidiarity 
principle to ward off EC legislation, a practice which has continued in the post- 
Maastricht era when some of these same proposals resurfaced (Golub 1996c).
Besides proposals which languished in COREPER or were defeated in the 
Council, a vast literature (often the very sources cited to confirm ratcheting!) 
documents LCDs where no significant costs were imposed on national groups. 
This includes instances where in practice EC law doesnt apply to a state, such as 
Ireland, because it has no affected industry or no pollution problems in a given 
policy sector (O'Donnell 1991, Bennett 1991:28-9). More often, EC law 
imposed no real costs because sufficiently stringent standards were either 
already in place under national legislation or were already under consideration 
at the time of adoption. And in many cases national pollution levels were far 
below those mandated by EC law, despite an absence of national legislation.
Taking seven of the air pollution directives as examples illustrates the 
prevalence of these LCD effects, as well as highlighting the tiny number of 
ratcheting exceptions:
S02 Directive 80/779: standards already met by Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Netherlands (Bennett 1991:46-51, 76- 
7), France incurred no sweeping changes or costs, and 
retained its preferred UES approach (Bennett 1991:62-4),
Italy's emissions were already falling (Bennett 1991:70),
UK had no S02 problem and had laws committed to smoke 
reduction (Bennett 1991:82-4).
Large plant framework Directive 84/360: Standards and 
authorisation procedures already in place for Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, France, Netherlands (Bennett 
1991:180-3, 185-193). UK kept BPM (Bennett 1991:196). 
Toothless, as it replaced BAT with BATNEEC, exchanged 
QMV for unanimous voting on subsequent standards, 




























































































much favoured by the UK (Zito 1995, Golub 1994, Haigh 
1989:225-6). Significant ratcheting in Italy (Bennett 
1991:189). Possible effects in Ireland (Bennett 1991:187).
Lead Directive 82/884: Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
France, Netherlands, Ireland already met standards (Bennett 
1991:87-9, 93, 98-9). UK already moving towards the 
standard (Haigh 1989:200). Possible ratcheting in France.
Nitrogen Directive 85/203: standards already met in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, UK 
(Bennett 1991:104-7, 119-121), France had few violations 
and stabilising emissions (Bennett 1991:111-2).
Sulphur in gas oil Directive 75/716: standards already met 
or laws already planned in Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Netherlands, UK (Bennett 1991:125-131, 134-7) (although 
possible ratcheting in Germany and Ireland).
Lead in petrol Directive 78/611: lead limits already met in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, UK (Bennett 
1991:140-3, 151, 157). Move to unleaded ratcheted only 
Belgium, and market forces were already pushing for 
widespread availability of unleaded (Bennett 1991:140- 
141).
Industrial plant Directive 84/360: standards already met in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Netherlands (Bennett 
1991:179-83, 187, 192). UK keeps BPM (Bennett
1991:196, Golub 1994). Various ratcheting in Ireland and 
Italy: permitting makes big impact in Ireland but very few 
plants (Bennett 1991:187), Italy seriously hit with costs 
(Bennett 1991:189).
Besides these seven directives, EC air laws were filled with specific derogations 
and loopholes for individual plants, which also allowed states to retain their 
preferred pollution reduction methods and even expand production in areas of 
high environmental quality (Golub 1994, 1996b, Bennett 1991:44, Haigh 1989, 
Rehbinder and Stewart 1985).
A similar story can be told for EC water directives prior to the SEA. 




























































































introduced vague wording which allowed them to designate for themselves 
which waters needed improvement. This rendered EC directives on freshwater 
fish and shellfish almost totally harmless (Haigh et al 1986:26-34, Lavoux 
1986:34, 41, Bennett 1986:32, 34). Also similar to the air directives, EC water 
laws frequently imposed weaker standards than already existed or had been 
planned in the member states, or provided a legal instrument for environmental 
standards that were already being met without specific regulation. For almost 
every state, EC laws on the biodegradability of detergents, surface water for 
drinking and chloro-alkali fall into this category (e.g—Kromarek 1986:93, 
Lavoux 1986:61, Bennett 1986:54, Haigh 1989:87-9). In signing many of the 
water directives, Britain was able to negotiate an important dual control system 
whereby through EQOs it could maintain its preferred dispersal and absorption 
approach while gaining the right to apply UES to particularly polluting plants in 
clean areas; Britain was also successful in negotiating emissions standards 
which took into account economic considerations (Golub 1994, 1996b).
For the group of EC directives devoted to problems of waste shipment 
and disposal, available evidence suggests that on the whole they imposed little, 
if any, significant costs on member states, derived almost entirely from pre­
existing national rules, and entailed only marginal adjustments to national 
regulatory systems (Haigh et al 1986:100, Lavoux 1986:102, Kromarek 
1986:109, 118, 124, 131, Bennett 1986:93). Even Directive 76/403 on PCBs, 
for example, which has been cited as an example of significant ratcheting 
similar to the ones found by Eichener (Rehbinder & Stewart 1985:214, Majone 
1994:54), appears less remarkable when examined closely. While OECD 
warnings in 1973 and many international disasters shot PCB protection up the 
agenda, there is no evidence of resistance to the directive in any member state, 
no important amendments were made to the draft proposal, and national laws 
were already in place to deal with PCBs (Kromarek 1986:120-2, Lavoux 
1986:91-2, Haigh 1989:152). Similarly, there is no indication in the literature 
that this directive involved heavy compliance costs.
On the whole, the EC Environmental Law in Practice Reports, along with 
other studies, give the impression that EC directives forced states to make many 
cosmetic changes, and sometimes hire a few additional staff. Much is made 
about having to introduce binding standards (Bennett 1991:199, Haigh et al 
1986:98, 105), but the body of the reports indicate that in almost every case 
these alterations merely verified the fact that certain types of pollution were not 
occurring. The remainder of cases usually indicate minor extensions to pre­




























































































This perspective undercuts the strength of ratcheting claims, including those 
made in a few of the Membership Evaluated Series books (e.g.-'-van Maasacker 
and Aarsten 1990). For both of these groups of studies, their purely juridical 
analysis exaggerates the ratcheting effect by overlooking the question of new 
regulatory costs and the possibility that states were already moving towards 
new policies. Certainly more thorough research is required before concluding 
that the bulk of EC environmental law pre-87 was the result of a LCD 
bargaining game, but the initial evidence points in this direction.
IV. Ratcheted Bargaining Outcomes
Even if LCDs predominated, the interesting question is to explain the 
residual cases of ratcheting under conditions of unanimity. Several mechanisms 
derived from Ll/bargaining theory and integration literature might account for 
these policy outcomes (Vogel 1995, 1996, Putnam 1988, Moravcsik 1993, 
1994, Rehbinder and Stewart 1985, Sbragia 1996, Haas 1980). They are 
portrayed here as analytically distinct, but in practice they are sometimes 
difficult to distinguish and can operate simultaneously:
1) California effect: In contrast to the feared "race to the bottom", regulatory 
competition creates a race to the top, with large green markets driving the 
integration process. Individual states, particularly Germany and California, 
threaten to impose higher standards unilaterally, thereby excluding "dirty" 
foreign goods from their domestic markets. In order to maintain market access, 
other member states are forced to either meet these environmental standards 
entirely, or agree to harmonised EC standards at a somewhat ratcheted level of 
environmental protection. Theoretically, product standards represent the least 
interesting cases because the widespread aversion to fragmented European 
markets generates consensus for action and states therefore have extremely high 
incentives to find collective solutions in the form of harmonised EC laws. 
Nevertheless, there remain important empirical questions of which factors are 
necessary for the California effect to operate, what type of bargaining takes 
place, and why states agree to the content of specific laws.
2) explicit issue linkage (horsetrading, package deals): ratcheting could result 
when negotiators make explicit trade-offs amongst policies, either within or 




























































































tighter and thus costlier standards for sewage treatment in exchange for a lower 
contribution to the EC budget, higher agricultural prices, revised 
pharmaceutical standards or changes in the structure of the VAT. Intra-sectoral 
linkage, on the other hand, might involve accepting higher sewage standards in 
exchange for laxer air pollution standards or looser environmental impact 
assessment rules.
3) diffuse reciprocity: environmental ratcheting could also result from 
concessions on a specific policy in expectation of unspecified later gains. 
Perceived gains can take the form of specific envisaged policies or the 
expectation that the overall benefits of membership are greater than zero. 
Securing benefits from specific later outcomes possibly depends on intangible 
factors, such as accumulating goodwill by appearing a good European. Diffuse 
reciprocity also appears in another important form: with many issues on the 
table, no state has the political capital to resist them all, so inevitable 
concessions result. Nevertheless, policy outcomes are reached because there is 
an expected payoff from remaining a "member of the club", rather than because 
a reformulation of identity or interests transformed the process from one of 
bargaining into one of problem solving.
4) side payments: states might also offer concessions on a specific policy in 
exchange for a straightforward bribe, such as increased structural or cohesion 
funds.
5) slack cutting: precisely the opposite dynamic to the "tying hands" approach 
which results in LCD outcomes, slack cutting involves collusion amongst 
national representatives in order to escape constraints imposed by domestic 
actors. A variety of advantages are conferred on national officials who operate 
simultaneously in the domestic and EU arenas—the two levels of policymaking- 
-allowing them to redefine their win-sets to include higher environmental 
standards. These advantages include, among other things, selective 
manipulation and dispersal of information during bargaining, institutional 
insulation, and control of initiatives, each of which places domestic opponents 
in substantially weakened positions.
6) expected non-compliance: ratcheting might reflect the willingness of certain 




























































































The projected costs imposed by EC standards would be considered irrelevant by 
states with dismal domestic implementation and enforcement apparatus.
Turning to the empirical evidence, we can ask which of these mechanisms has 
been important for the adoption of stringent EC environmental standards, and 
which have been "disproved" as important causal mechanisms.
1) From the outset the California effect argument lacks a key analytical link: 
that unilateral green trade barriers were deemed legal under Article 30/36. In 
fact the ECJ doctrine in Dassonville and Cassis suggests otherwise (Cases 8/74 
11974] and 120/78 [1978], Rehbinder and Stewart 1985:10-11). The Court drew 
broad prohibitions against measures restricting intra-EC trade, and 
environmental aspects were not explicitly added to Article 36's exceptions until 
the French waste oil case (Case 240/83 [1983]) (subsequently extended by the 
Danish bottles case (Case 302/86 [1988])). Although potentially allowable even 
under Cassis, the ECJ never ruled on the legality of unilateral environmental 
action prior to 1983. Perhaps the most that can be made of this mechanism is 
that the hassle and uncertainty of legal action, thus the possibility of a 
California effect, forced compromises at levels higher than LCD.
Something like the California effect certainly played a role in the case of 
car emissions: some states signed because the directives would impose no costs, 
or because these costs were an inevitable product of market forces. For 
example, the size of their export markets meant that Belgium, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands already met vehicle standard directives 70/220-83/351 and thus 
faced no new costs (Bennett 1991:162-4).
But even here ratcheting should not be overstated, as optional 
harmonisation protected producers with huge domestic markets from suffering 
new production costs and intense intergovernmental bargaining still occurred. 
Britain, France and Italy all opposed catalytic converters, thereby blocking the 
1985 Commission proposal.
Tighter car standards in the mid-1980s did result from a California 
effect, but not with the legal support of the ECJ. In 1983 Germany introduced 
unilateral restrictions on polluting (and thus predominantly foreign) cars, 
accompanied by preferential tax breaks for clean cars. France and the UK 
threatened to drag Germany before the ECJ for violating Article 92 on state 
aids, but no ruling was ever made on the legality of German emission standards 
or tax break measures (Arp 1995:229-31). With the ECJ as an ally, or at least a 




























































































market, placing enormous pressure on other member states to meet higher 
standards and eventually tighten EC law dealing with vehicle emissions and 
catalytic converters.
Despite the example of car standards, even at its best the California effect 
only provides a partial explanation for the adoption of EC environmental laws. 
Viewed from a functionalist perspective (Pollack 1994) or a bargaining 
perspective (Moravcsik 1993:502), authors who invoke the California effect 
provide no reasons for the ratcheting of process standards, which bring no 
export benefits but only higher production costs. Green states would obviously 
push for uniformity at the highest possible level but laggard states would cling 
to competitive advantage (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985). Many examples of 
such laws exist in the history of EC environmental policy: paper pulp mills, 
drinking water and bathing standards, mercury discharges, titanium dioxide, all 
the waste disposal laws.
2) Widespread usage of inter-sectoral package deals is constantly claimed in 
literature on EC policymaking, invariably without any empirical support. 
Basically there is no credibility in cross-sectoral concessions. Far too many 
people are required to complete such linkage (not the same person making and 
receiving concessions), while serious timing problems preclude effective deals 
and encourage defection for 'new circumstances’ (long-range policy such as the 
EC budget is only negotiated every three years). Domestic opposition also 
prevents linkage because someone always loses. As LI recognises, you only get 
inter-sectoral linkage when you can offload the costs onto some disorganised 
group (Moravcsik 1993:505). As producer/industrial groups are neither diffuse 
nor passive, government officials would have little room to accept expensive 
environmental ratcheting in order to gain in other policy areas.
Not a single example of inter-sectoral linkage has actually been identified 
in the literature on EC environmental policy. Besides theoretical objections, 
several studies confirm the absence of inter-sectoral linkage in practice, shifting 
the burden on to exponents of this mechanism (Golub 1996b, 1997, Arp 1995, 
Liefferink 1995).
But intra-sectoral linkage plays a significant role because credibility of 
concessions is higher: the same officials bargain repeatedly over time, reducing 
coordination problems, and multiple environmental issues often arise on the 
same agenda, reducing chances of defection. It should be noted that LI allows 
for this type of ratcheting (Moravcsik 1993:506). Lionel Barber, often cited for 




























































































the power of COREPER and the role of intersectoral package deals (widgets for 
whiskey example) admits that such deals are extremely rare; inter-sectoral 
bargains are the exception to the rule of intense intra-sectoral bargaining—such 
as wine for whiskey (personal communication, 1 April 1995).
In the field of EC environmental policy, intra-sectoral linkage was crucial 
to the adoption of certain air pollution directives, with Germany making 
concessions on car standards in order to secure agreement for large industrial 
plants (Arp 1995:238). The Netherlands also employed this type of linkage 
frequently, sometimes in order to avoid costs of EC laws, other times to achieve 
as much ratcheting as possible in certain areas where it was a green leader 
(Liefferink 1995).
3) Diffuse reciprocity is hard to identify, but underpins Li's claim that 
bargaining doesnt necessarily yield LCDs—"since it is generally in [a state's] 
interest to compromise somewhat rather than veto an agreement" (Moravcsik 
1993:501). Tangible or intangible, the expected future payoff from concessions 
is crucial, thus differentiating diffuse reciprocity from functionalist dynamics of 
problem solving and identity reformulation. Spain's wholesale acceptance of EC 
environmental obligations in order to demonstrate its position as a central 
player on the European stage provides a clear example of diffuse reciprocity in 
combination with side payments—Spain expected to gain more from full and 
equal membership than it would from environmental derogations (Pridham 
1995, Pridham and Konstadakopulos 1994). But examples are also available 
from the original member states. The sampling of surface water directive was 
opposed by both the Lander and the German government on grounds of cost and 
work load, but eventually accepted "for reasons of Community integration" 
(Kromarek 1986:39). Germany was also willing to sign what it saw as a flawed 
freshwater fish proposal to "show its good European will" (Kromarek 1986:54), 
although such concessions are easy when no costs are involved.
More important than explicit expressions of diffuse reciprocity, this 
mechanism often takes the form of a state simply not being able to veto 
everything. British negotiators in the 1970s, for example, were opposed to both 
the bathing water and dangerous substances directives, but chose to focus their 
resistance on the latter, thereby securing the dual-measurement system of EQOs 
and UES at the expense of taking a risk on bathing water standards (Golub 
1996b, 1997). The need to prioritise resistance to groups of directives allows 





























































































Diffuse reciprocity also plays an important role at the implementation 
stage. Although very difficult to distinguish from slack, the two mechanisms 
often working in unison, government officials can pressure domestic groups to 
enforce tight standards with the claim that such sacrifices are part of a European 
game that offers overall advantages. Thus Germany appealed to "loyalty 
towards the EC" and a "desire not to spoil European harmony" when imposing 
costly water laws on its industry, noting that other states were doing the same 
(Kromarek 1986:132).
4) side payments: although crucial for southern states during and after the SEA, 
the record reveals no examples pre-1987, and none for any of the northern 
states.
5) slack: Slack cutting in the southern member states has allowed a significant 
amount of environmental ratcheting (Collier and Golub 1996, Pridham 1995, 
Pridham and Konstadakopulos 1994, Lewanski 1993). This could explain the 
various examples presented above where Italy was the state primarily affected 
by EC standards. While most prevalent in the South, there is no theoretical 
reason why slack couldnt also account for the few cases of ratcheting in the 
north. It is noteworthy that in the case of Britain, somewhat of an environmental 
laggard where slack might be expected to play an important role, studies have 
found no instances where DOE members exploited the European arena to bring 
home tighter regulations which their domestic ministerial colleagues would 
otherwise have blocked (see Arp 1995 for cars, Zito 1995 for air, Golub 1996b, 
1997 for an extensive review of British environmental bargaining).
Slack cutting remains difficult to identify at the adoption stage, but it 
certainly becomes an important mechanism at the implementation phase. In a 
number of cases German officials sought to secure compliance with ratcheted 
standards by scapegoating the EC (Kromarek 1986:130). French officials made 
similar efforts, invoking EC obligations when responding to industrial 
complaints of economic disadvantage from higher environmental costs (Lavoux 
1986:101-2). Slack cutting also allows officials to reinterpret their previous 
bargains, as seen in Germany's portrayal of costs from the bathing water 
directive as "justified" and "in our own interest" after having resisted aspects of 
the original proposal (Kromarek 1986:62-71).
6) expected non-compliance: as with slack, this mechanism remains extremely 




























































































intentions to fulfil its obligations. Nevertheless, available information suggests 
that expected non-compliance plays a more substantial role for southern 
European states, where the Mediterranean syndrome and other systemic 
problems prevent effective enforcement (La Spina and Sciortino 1993, 
Lewanski 1993, Pridham 1995, Pridham and Konstadakopulos 1994, Collier 
and Golub 1996). These states top the list for Article 169 infringement 
proceedings, transposition problems and practical implementation failures. To 
cite just a few examples, lack of funding and enforcement, particularly at the 
regional level, resulted in Italian implementation failure for EC directives on 
S02, lead, sulphur in gas, and lead in petrol (Bennett 1991:70, 97, 131, 148).
Each of the previous six mechanisms derives from a model of integration 
which focuses on the adoption stage of EC legislation and why each state 
signed particular proposals. The ability of these mechanisms to account for 
ratcheting could demonstrate the extent to which the member states foresee the 
consequences of their agreements and thus exercise tight control over the 
integration process. In short, these mechanisms illuminate some of the many 
reasons why states might allow EC laws to ratchet up national standards. 
However, a substantial amount of ratcheting might take place despite the 
expectations of member states, demonstrating the gap between why states sign a 
law and the eventual effect that law has on national practices. The prevalence of 
these unintended consequences determines whether integration consists of 
much more than bargains and depends on factors other than strict control by 
member states.
In fact the record reveals a variety of unintended consequences, casting 
doubt on some of the central claims of LI. Two separate but related facets of 
unintended consequences require consideration:
1) unintended consequences from inherent bargaining limits: the general 
phenomenon consists of negotiators not foreseeing the consequences of their 
bargains (Haigh 1986:105). Ratcheting could result from bounded rationality, or 
from a lack of basic information regarding the proposal at hand, or simply the 
weak negotiation skills of an inept national official.
Unintended consequences appear in many forms. First, highly technical 
and protracted negotiations over EC environmental proposals often result in last 
minute changes to annexes with no time for national officials to carry out a 
cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) on the final draft. This played a role in drinking 




























































































time but one important detail got through without sufficient consideration—the 
infamous nitrate standard which ratcheted up even German law (Interview with 
British negotiator/industry representative, 5 July 1995). Unintended 
consequences also account for acceptance of the nitrate standard by Germany 
and the Netherlands (Kromarek 1986:50-1, Bennett 1986:28-9).
The endemic bargaining failures of Italian officials help explain why Italy 
signed so many expensive EC environmental laws. Facing a cash shortage the 
Italians often chose not to send any officials to Brussels during the formulation 
of proposals, and could not afford to commission extensive CBA, leaving them 
in no position to understand or resist stringent EC directives (Collier and Golub 
1996, Lewanski 1993). It is also interesting to note the conflicting views of 
whether unintended consequences resulted in substantial and costly emissions 
reductions by German industry in the context of the North Sea Conferences 
(compare Kromarek 1986:100 with Haas et al 1993).
In a number of other cases green states sought to ratchet up standards in 
other states, export their preferred approach to pollution control (such as BAT) 
and avoid competitive disadvantage, but ended up having to incur more 
domestic costs than anticipated. For Germany, EC laws on dangerous 
substances, groundwater, titanium dioxide, and chloro-alkali demonstrate this 
effect (Kromarek 1986:74-5, 81-5, 93, 99), as does the bathing water directive 
for France (Lavoux 1986:45-8). Further research is needed to determine 
whether these costs were truly unanticipated, or if France and Germany signed 
the bathing water directive as part of an intra-sectoral bargain.
An important reason why costs of these laws were unanticipated stems 
from the fact that some states simply did not take the process of European 
integration seriously, assuming that their domestic standards would conform 
with some interpretation of EC law. During the 1970s British negotiators were 
certainly labouring under this false belief (Golub 1994). A passive approach to 
policymaking was particularly attractive when costs fell far in the future, as 
illustrated by France's acceptance of air pollution standards and British 
acceptance of water laws (Bennett 1991:62-4, Golub 1994).
2) A second crucial aspect of unintended consequences in secondary EC law is 
that they depend on actors outside the scope of the original policy bargains. As 
mentioned above, focusing on the bargain alone explains initial outcomes but 
not the full effects of EC policy. While vague wording and expected 
derogations allow states to reach a consensus in the Council, this vagueness has 




























































































and the ECJ, neither of which were parties to any of the original bargains, 
define or redefine provisions of the directive in concrete terms through 
infringement proceedings and legal interpretation. States may then find 
themselves facing substantial costs from directives which they had viewed as 
LCD bargaining outcomes.
ECJ legal rulings and narrow Commission interpretations of derogations 
have transformed a number of what might have been vague and toothless 
environmental laws into expensive and legally binding instruments, particularly 
in the area of water protection. The UK has been forced to invest billions of 
pounds to improve its bathing and drinking water (Golub 1996b, 1997), as has 
Germany (Kromarek 1986:46), France (Lavoux 1986:46-7), and the 
Netherlands (Bennett 1986:40). Germany was also forced to make unanticipated 
investments in Ti02 reduction (Kromarek 1986:99).
Conclusions
While this paper provides no support for the functionalist model of 
integration, it equally reveals significant limitations in the LI model as currently 
constructed and highlights areas where additional research is badly needed.
Although the field is supposedly over researched, we know almost 
nothing about the period 1972-87, which not only makes it difficult to say 
anything meaningful about environmental integration, but also inhibits 
meaningful conclusions about the integration process and ongoing debate 
between LI and functionalism. It is also difficult to identify properly the 
decisive mechanisms of integration. Frequent ratcheting from intra-sectoral 
bargains and expected costs would suggest a form of LI as a model for 
integration, while widespread unintended consequences would point towards 
functionalism.
Bearing these methodological limitations firmly in mind, the available 
evidence seems to offer no support for the functionalist position. The enormous 
number of LCD outcomes disproves the central prediction of unexpectedly high 
regulations. It was certainly not the case during the 1970s and early 1980s that 
EC standards were set at the highest common denominator or even exceeded 
any pre-existing national legislation, as Eichener suggested in the case of 
workplace laws.
There is also no evidence that psychological spillover and technical 




























































































displaced by collective identity and unexpectedly high standards. All the 
evidence indicates that powerful industry/producer groups defended national 
positions in working groups. Nothing suggests that these groups suddenly lost 
influence when a proposal went to COREPER. Rather, COREPER deliberations 
were negotiations involving bargains which reflected important national 
interests.
While this does not entirely disprove the role of functionalism in 
European integration, as this paper dealt only with environmental policymaking 
under conditions of unanimity during the period 1972-86, it does indicate how 
Eichener's conclusions should not be extrapolated indiscriminately to earlier 
years or other policy areas. As a next step, attempts should be made to identify 
functionalist dynamics in EC environmental policymaking after the SEA, a task 
which exceeded the bounds of the current analysis. One should not exclude the 
possibility that QMV transforms the atmosphere in which policymaking takes 
place.
In contrast to functionalism, bargaining explains a substantial amount 
about the development of this policy area during the period 1972-86. 
Functionalism tells us why there might be something to sign, perhaps even what 
might be signed, but bargaining tells us what interests were taken into 
negotiations and why states signed the specific environmental proposals. All the 
theses, legal reports and articles referred to above confirm the existence of 
strong preferences by industrial/producer groups, careful consideration of costs 
from EC regulation, and active insider involvement in the decisionmaking 
process at both the national and EC level.
Rather than significant ratcheting, negotiations produced a vast number 
of LCD outcomes in accordance with the interests of dominant national 
industry/producer groups. In addition to several vetoed proposals, a plethora of 
EC laws imposed no tighter standards or new regulatory costs on domestic 
groups. In most cases national legislation was already in place or under 
consideration, or EC regulatory standards were already met without explicit 
domestic legislation. The combination of vague provisions, derogations and 
loopholes makes it difficult to characterise EC environmental law as the source 
of a steady ratcheting effect in the member states.
It is worth repeating that much more evidence is required before we can 
claim with any certainty whether ratcheting was the exception or the rule. Either 
way, however, this does not preclude the steady upgrading of common interests, 
it clarifies its source: rather than upward ratcheting imposed from supranational 




























































































gradual rise in what constitutes the lowest common denominator. As 
environmental awareness ascends domestic political agendas, due to publicised 
environmental disasters and scientific breakthroughs, dominant industrial 
groups accept, willingly or unwillingly, higher national environmental 
standards, and thus are in a position to agree on ever tighter EC standards as 
national preferences evolve towards greater environmental protection.
Rather than functionalism's claims of problem solving atmospheres or 
identity reformation amongst the actors, identifiable bargaining mechanisms 
account for several cases of ratcheting even under conditions of unanimity. In 
these cases, government officials attempted to gain competitive advantages for 
their domestic industry/producer groups and minimise the competitive 
disadvantages associated with ratcheting, but were also sometimes willing to 
incur the costs of specific proposals because of expected future gains from 
reciprocal concessions in the field of environment or from the general payoff of 
continued EC membership. The California effect produced by potential 
exclusion from export markets, intra-sectoral linkage, diffuse reciprocity, and 
slack all played a role in the cases where EC environmental standards imposed 
substantial adjustment costs on member states.
Despite the relative strength of the bargaining model, this study 
highlights several fundamental limitations of LI as it is currently constructed. 
Most importantly, the evidence suggests that integration does not strengthen 
"the state", regardless of whether bargaining outcomes are LCDs or ratcheted 
standards. While they may not impose new costs on industry, LCDs are binding 
legal instruments which states may not apply selectively, which limit the 
autonomy, manoeuvrability and sovereignty of national executives in a number 
of significant ways: LCDs stop states from backsliding and repealing 
environmental laws in times of economic recession or after a change of 
administration, force states to meet domestic deadlines, and introduce an 
element of supranational enforcement (Golub 1996a). Indeed there are many 
examples of EC law forcing states to follow through with heavy investments in 
environmental protection which might otherwise have remained nothing more 
than empty domestic promises.
A second fundamental shortcoming of LI is its conception of the state as 
a unitary actor, monopolising the interface between domestic politics and EC 
institutions, capable of wielding the full arsenal of bargaining tactics at any 
point in time. In the field of environment, not all of the possible bargaining 
mechanisms were utilised with the same frequency; their importance varied 




























































































Identifying which officials are actually capable of employing these 
mechanisms, the conditions under which they are used, as well as the relative 
frequency of their application sheds light on whether daily policymaking, in 
contrast to high profile history making bargains, strengthens the state as 
currently conceptualised. In fact, daily policymaking can only be understood if 
we disaggregate the state, taking into consideration the variety of specialised 
COREPER working groups and Council meetings which create secondary 
community law. Disaggregation provides a different picture of bargaining, and 
thus of the integration process itself.
In order to apply LI to secondary legislation, it is essential to identify 
which officials are required to achieve issue linkage, and who is the beneficiary 
of slack when EC environmental policy is negotiated. Amongst unitary state 
actors issue linkage involves far fewer logistical obstacles than amongst actors 
in a disaggregated state. In order to have any credibility, inter-sectoral linkage 
requires tight coordination amongst officials in several national ministries and 
within COREPER, as well as the ability of these officials to deliver on 
commitments which might fall in the medium or distant future. Intra-sectoral 
linkage requires far less coordination and good will, as bargains are 
concentrated amongst a small group of officials, usually green ministers and 
technical experts, and multiple issues tire covered over a shorter timespan.
Li's misrepresentation of the principle-agent relationship also has 
enormous implications for the role of slack in daily policymaking. For the big 
bargains between chief executives, it may be reasonable to conceptualise "the 
state" as "a single agent" (Moravcsik 1994:4). However, for secondary 
legislation negotiated by nine, twelve, or fifteen disaggregated states, any 
national official operating in Brussels enjoys the same advantages over 
information control, initiative, ideas and institutions that LI attributes to a 
unitary actor. The existence of highly fragmented states, the pieces of which 
negotiate in parallel without coordination, allows EC policy to develop without 
a single controlling national executive.
This creates two important types of intra-state slack which LI overlooks: 
environmental ministers enjoy inter-ministerial slack when cutting deals in 
Brussels which have been blocked domestically by traditionally powerful 
ministries such as Finance, Trade and Industry, or Agriculture; environmental 
ministers also gain intra-ministerial slack within their own departments, as 
green issues are often only a minor element within "superdepartments" dealing 
with housing, planning and local government. Each of these mechanisms clearly 




























































































of national officials operating in Brussels by increasing the manoeuvrability of 
lead departments. This line of argument represents an important departure from 
Moravcsik's position, using the same slack-cutting mechanisms he specifies but 
reaching a very different overall conclusion.
Future research might test a hypothesis which seems to emerge from the 
evidence considered above: that the prevalence of inter-sectoral linkage is 
inversely proportional to the prevalence of slack. To do this, inter-sectoral 
linkage and slack could be placed in the context of varying levels of 
coordination within governments (LI proponents recognise the importance of 
this but have not considered the full ramifications on their principal-agent 
model. See Moravcsik 1994:66, fn 6). We would expect that inter-sectoral 
linkage would occur most frequently in states with highly coordinated cabinet 
and civil service structures, for example Britain. Officials from states with 
highly fragmented bureaucracies on the other hand, particularly in Southern 
Europe, would have less capacity for issue linkage but maximum scope for 
cutting slack. If this is indeed the case, inter-sectoral slack may have particular 
force in Southern Europe (Golub 1996a, Collier and Golub 1996). Even so, the 
fact that substantial bureaucratic fragmentation and EC policy co-ordination 
problems are evident in most member states (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988, 
Pappas 1995) would suggest that cases of ratcheting from inter-sectoral slack 
would far outnumber those from inter-sectoral issue linkage.
Other factors might also be sought to explain the variation in types of 
bargaining mechanisms deployed by each state. Diffuse reciprocity, linkage and 
slack should all be related to the time horizons of negotiating parties. For many 
states and their domestic industries, the long-term costs of directives might 
appear acceptable because of short term advantages gained from bolstering their 
green image. Similarly, national representatives from states with highly unstable 
governments, or with a history of frequent government turnover, might be more 
willing to incur the regulatory costs associated with environmental 
improvement because the electoral punishment for such costs will fall on future 
administrations.
One important conclusion which may be drawn from the evidence is that 
bargaining allows a substantial amount of ratcheting not just when integration 
represents a positive sum game—when every state gains from the deal. While 
inter-sectoral linkage and side payments might fully compensate a state for 
signing a specific environmental proposal, these mechanisms played no role in 
daily policymaking process! Rather, because intra-sectoral bargaining 




























































































to minimise their losses. Equally important, diffuse reciprocity also allows 
enormous scope for ratcheting even when states do not gain from expected 
future concessions. States might sign not because membership pays off, but 
because membership hurts less than exit!
This paper has also highlighted how the extreme complexity of directives 
and the power of the ECJ provide ample room, both in theory and practice, for 
significant unintended consequences throughout the production and application 
of EC secondary legislation in the area of environmental policy. To the extent 
that daily policymaking accounts for the bulk of integration, rather than Li's 
five big history making bargains, member states, let alone chief executives, are 
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